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The strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play : (Record no. 33174)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01227naa a2200181uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 0051717435137
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211171622.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 100517s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name ARARAL, Eduardo
9 (RLIN) 40138
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title The strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play :
Remainder of title an institutional rational choice analysis
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Cary :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Oxford University,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. oct. 2009
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Foreign aid plays an important role in developing countries, but little is empirically known how it affects incentives of recipient bureaucracies. I provide a model and analytic case study to understand the strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play. My findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical expectations of institutional rational choice: bureaucrats attempt to ensure bureaucratic survival, whereas donors ensure growth of loan portfolio. These findings, however, are not consistent with the Samaritan's Dilemma and the Patron's Dilemma
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
Related parts 19, 4, p. 852-872
Place, publisher, and date of publication Cary : Oxford University, oct. 2009
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 10531858
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20100517
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1743^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Daiane
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20120517
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1348^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Geisneer

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Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

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