The strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play : an institutional rational choice analysis
By: ARARAL, Eduardo
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ArticlePublisher: Cary : Oxford University, oct. 2009Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 19, 4, p. 852-872Abstract: Foreign aid plays an important role in developing countries, but little is empirically known how it affects incentives of recipient bureaucracies. I provide a model and analytic case study to understand the strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play. My findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical expectations of institutional rational choice: bureaucrats attempt to ensure bureaucratic survival, whereas donors ensure growth of loan portfolio. These findings, however, are not consistent with the Samaritan's Dilemma and the Patron's Dilemma
Foreign aid plays an important role in developing countries, but little is empirically known how it affects incentives of recipient bureaucracies. I provide a model and analytic case study to understand the strategic games that donors and bureaucrats play. My findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical expectations of institutional rational choice: bureaucrats attempt to ensure bureaucratic survival, whereas donors ensure growth of loan portfolio. These findings, however, are not consistent with the Samaritan's Dilemma and the Patron's Dilemma
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