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If prevention is better than cure, why do firms do the opposite? (Record no. 33409)

000 -LEADER
fixed length control field 01652naa a2200217uu 4500
001 - CONTROL NUMBER
control field 0052015004737
003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER
control field OSt
005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION
control field 20190211171844.0
008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION
fixed length control field 100520s2009 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d
999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA)
Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] PHL2MARC21 1.1
041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE
Language code of text/sound track or separate title eng
100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name SINGER, Marcos
9 (RLIN) 40355
245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT
Title If prevention is better than cure, why do firms do the opposite?
260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC.
Place of publication, distribution, etc. Oxfordshire :
Name of publisher, distributor, etc. Routledge,
Date of publication, distribution, etc. set./out. 2009
520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC.
Summary, etc. Common wisdom tells that, regarding quality, prevention is better than appraisal. Although scholars and practitioners concur with that, firms in practice prioritise appraisal, leading to high non-conformance quality costs. To unravel this puzzle, we understand quality as the combined result of prevention, done by the firm's back office (e.g. production), and appraisal, done by the front office (e.g. marketing). We propose a game theoretic model for which quality expenditure is an equilibrium outcome that depends on the cost of technology, the customers' sensitivity to quality, and the distribution of (variable) incentives within the firm. We conjecture those conditions for the reported quality expenditures of several companies, and calculate their optimal quality investment policy. As advocated by experts, we find that prevention should more than double appraisal, and non-conformance costs should approach zero.
590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN)
Local note Volume 20
590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN)
Local note Numbers 9-10
700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME
Personal name DONOSO, Patricio
9 (RLIN) 40356
773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY
Title Total Quality Management & Business Excellence
Related parts 20, 9-10, p. 905-919
Place, publisher, and date of publication Oxfordshire : Routledge, set./out. 2009
International Standard Serial Number ISSN 14783363
Record control number
942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA)
Koha item type Periódico
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20100520
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1500^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Daiane
998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN)
-- 20100531
Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) 1323^b
Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) Carolina

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