<style type="text/css"> .wpb_animate_when_almost_visible { opacity: 1; }</style> Enap catalog › Details for: If prevention is better than cure, why do firms do the opposite?
Normal view MARC view ISBD view

If prevention is better than cure, why do firms do the opposite?

By: SINGER, Marcos.
Contributor(s): DONOSO, Patricio.
Material type: materialTypeLabelArticlePublisher: Oxfordshire : Routledge, set./out. 2009Total Quality Management & Business Excellence 20, 9-10, p. 905-919Abstract: Common wisdom tells that, regarding quality, prevention is better than appraisal. Although scholars and practitioners concur with that, firms in practice prioritise appraisal, leading to high non-conformance quality costs. To unravel this puzzle, we understand quality as the combined result of prevention, done by the firm's back office (e.g. production), and appraisal, done by the front office (e.g. marketing). We propose a game theoretic model for which quality expenditure is an equilibrium outcome that depends on the cost of technology, the customers' sensitivity to quality, and the distribution of (variable) incentives within the firm. We conjecture those conditions for the reported quality expenditures of several companies, and calculate their optimal quality investment policy. As advocated by experts, we find that prevention should more than double appraisal, and non-conformance costs should approach zero.
Tags from this library: No tags from this library for this title. Log in to add tags.
    average rating: 0.0 (0 votes)
No physical items for this record

Common wisdom tells that, regarding quality, prevention is better than appraisal. Although scholars and practitioners concur with that, firms in practice prioritise appraisal, leading to high non-conformance quality costs. To unravel this puzzle, we understand quality as the combined result of prevention, done by the firm's back office (e.g. production), and appraisal, done by the front office (e.g. marketing). We propose a game theoretic model for which quality expenditure is an equilibrium outcome that depends on the cost of technology, the customers' sensitivity to quality, and the distribution of (variable) incentives within the firm. We conjecture those conditions for the reported quality expenditures of several companies, and calculate their optimal quality investment policy. As advocated by experts, we find that prevention should more than double appraisal, and non-conformance costs should approach zero.

Volume 20

Numbers 9-10

There are no comments for this item.

Log in to your account to post a comment.

Click on an image to view it in the image viewer

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública

Endereço:

  • Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos
  • Funcionamento: segunda a sexta-feira, das 9h às 19h
  • +55 61 2020-3139 / biblioteca@enap.gov.br
  • SPO Área Especial 2-A
  • CEP 70610-900 - Brasília/DF
<
Acesso à Informação TRANSPARÊNCIA

Powered by Koha