Political economics : (Record no. 524325)
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| 000 -LÍDER | |
|---|---|
| Campo de controle fixo | nam a22 7a 4500 |
| 003 - CÓDIGO MARC DA AGÊNCIA CATALOGADORA | |
| Campo de controle | BR-BrENAP |
| 005 - DATA E HORA DA ÚLTIMA ATUALIZAÇÃO | |
| Campo de controle | 20230405175426.0 |
| 008 - CAMPO DE TAMANHO FIXO | |
| Campo fixo de controle | 230405b xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 por d |
| 020 ## - ISBN - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER | |
| ISBN | 9780262661317 |
| 040 ## - FONTE DA CATALOGAÇÃO | |
| Agência catalogadora | BR-BrENAP |
| Idioma da catalogação | Pt_BR |
| 041 ## - IDIOMA | |
| Idioma do texto | eng |
| 090 ## - NÚMERO DE CLASSIFICAÇÃO | |
| Número de Classificação | 338.9 |
| Cutter | P4679p |
| 100 1# - ENTRADA PRINCIPAL - NOME PESSOAL | |
| Nome pessoal | Persson, Torsten |
| 9 (RLIN) | 68085 |
| 245 10 - TÍTULO PRINCIPAL | |
| Título principal | Political economics : |
| Subtítulo | explaining economic policy / |
| Indicação de responsabilidade | por Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. -- |
| 260 ## - IMPRENTA (PUBLICAÇÃO, DISTRIBUIÇÃO, ETC.) | |
| Lugar de publicação, distribuição, etc. | Cambridge, |
| -- | Massachusetts : |
| Nome do editor, distribuidor, etc. | MIT Press, |
| Data de publicação, distribuição, etc | 2000. |
| 300 ## - DESCRIÇÃO FÍSICA | |
| Extensão | xix, 533 p. : |
| Detalhes físicos adicionais | il. |
| 504 ## - NOTA DE BIBLIOGRAFIA, ETC | |
| Nota de bibliografia | Inclui bibliografia e índice. |
| 505 ## - NOTA DE CONTEÚDO | |
| Título | 1 General Introduction |
| -- | 1.1 Economic Policy |
| -- | 1.2 Politics |
| -- | 1.2 Politics |
| -- | I TOOLS OF POLITICAL ECONOMICS |
| -- | 2 Preferences and Institutions |
| -- | 2.1 A General Policy Problem |
| -- | 2.2 Restricting Preferences |
| -- | 2.3 Restricting Institutions |
| -- | 2.4 Discussion |
| -- | 2.5 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 2.6 Problems |
| -- | 3 Electoral Competition |
| -- | 3.1 A Simple Model of Public Finance |
| -- | 3.2 Downsian Electoral Competition |
| -- | 3.3 Median-Voter Equilibria |
| -- | 3.4 Probabilistic Voting |
| -- | 3.5 Lobbying |
| -- | 3.6 Discussion |
| -- | 3.7 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 3.8 Problems |
| -- | 4 Agency |
| -- | 4.1 Efficient Electoral Competition |
| -- | 4.2 Inefficient Electoral Competition |
| -- | 4.3 Enforceability, Verifiability, and Observability |
| -- | 4.4 Electoral Accountability |
| -- | 4.5 Career Concerns |
| -- | 4.6 Discussion |
| -- | 4.7 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 4.8 Problems |
| -- | 5 Partisan Politicians |
| -- | 5.1 Policy Convergence |
| -- | 5.2 Policy Divergence |
| -- | 5.3 Endogenous Candidates |
| -- | 5.4 Legislative Bargaining |
| -- | 5.5 Discussion |
| -- | 5.6 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 5.7 Problems |
| -- | II REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS |
| -- | 6 General-Interest Politics |
| -- | 6.1 General Transfers |
| -- | 6.2 Pensions |
| -- | 6.3 Regional Transfers |
| -- | 6.4 Unemployment Insurance |
| -- | 6.5 Discussion |
| -- | 6.6 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 6.7 Problems |
| -- | 7 Special-Interest Politics |
| -- | 7.1 A Model of Local Public Goods |
| -- | 7.2 Legislative Bargaining |
| -- | 7.3 Lobbying |
| -- | 7.4 Electoral Competition |
| -- | 7.5 Interactions |
| -- | 7.6 Discussion |
| -- | 7.7 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 7.8 Problems |
| -- | III COMPARATIVE POLITICS |
| -- | 8 Electoral Rules and Electoral Competition |
| -- | 8.1 The Economic Model |
| -- | 8.2 The Politics of Electoral Competition |
| -- | 8.3 Single-District (Proportional) Elections |
| -- | 8.4 Multiple-District (Majoritarian) Elections |
| -- | 8.5 Broad versus Targeted Redistribution |
| -- | 8.6 Discussion |
| -- | 8.7 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 8.8 Problems |
| -- | 9 Institutions and Accountability |
| -- | 9.1 Electoral Rules and Career Concerns |
| -- | 9.2 Electoral Rules and Accountability |
| -- | 9.3 Separation of Powers |
| -- | 9.4 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 9.5 Problems |
| -- | 10 Political Regimes |
| -- | 10.1 Policy Choices in a Simple Legislature |
| -- | 10.2 Presidential-Congressional Regimes |
| -- | 10.3 Parliamentary Regimes |
| -- | 10.4 Discussion |
| -- | 10.5 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 10.6 Problems |
| -- | IV DYNAMIC POLITICS |
| -- | 11 Dynamic Policy Problems |
| -- | 11.1 Analyzing Dynamic Policy Games |
| -- | 11.2 Examples |
| -- | 11.3 Discussion |
| -- | 11.4 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 11.5 Problems |
| -- | 12 Capital Taxation |
| -- | 12.1 A Simple Model of Dynamic Taxation |
| -- | 12.2 Credibility |
| -- | 12.3 Politics |
| -- | 12.4 Tax Competition |
| -- | 12.5 Discussion |
| -- | 12.6 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 12.7 Problems |
| -- | 13 Public Debt |
| -- | 13.1 A Simple Model of Public Debt |
| -- | 13.2 The Dynamic Common-Pool Problem |
| -- | 13.3 Political Instability |
| -- | 13.4 Delayed Stabilizations |
| -- | 13.5 Debt and Intergenerational Politics |
| -- | 13.6 Discussion |
| -- | 13.7 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 13.8 Problems |
| -- | 14 Growth |
| -- | 14.1 Income Inequality and Growth |
| -- | 14.2 Political Instability and Growth |
| -- | 14.3 Special Interests, Rents, and Growth |
| -- | 14.4 Other Political Determinants of Growth |
| -- | 14.5 Discussion |
| -- | 14.6 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 14.7 Problems |
| -- | V MONETARY POLITICS |
| -- | 15 Credibility of Monetary Policy |
| -- | 15.1 A Simple Model of Monetary Policy |
| -- | 15.2 Ex Ante Optimality |
| -- | 15.3 Credibility |
| -- | 15.4 Reputation |
| -- | 15.5 Dynamics |
| -- | 15.6 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 15.7 Problems |
| -- | 16 Electoral Cycles |
| -- | 16.1 Career Concerns and Political Business Cycles |
| -- | 16.2 Partisan Cycles |
| -- | 16.3 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 16.4 Problems |
| -- | 17 Institutions and Incentives |
| -- | 17.1 Simple Rules and Escape Clauses |
| -- | 17.2 Central Bank Independence |
| -- | 17.3 Inflation Targets and Contracts |
| -- | 17.4 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 17.5 Problems |
| -- | 18 International Policy Coordination |
| -- | 18.1 A Simple Two-Country Model |
| -- | 18.2 Incentives |
| -- | 18.3 Institutions |
| -- | 18.4 Discussion |
| -- | 18.5 Notes on the Literature |
| -- | 18.6 Problems |
| -- | 19 What Next? |
| -- | 19.1 Some Positive Ouestions |
| -- | 19.2 Analytical Issues |
| -- | 19.3 Concluding Remarks |
| -- | References |
| -- | Author Index |
| -- | Subiect Index |
| 520 ## - NOTA DE RESUMO, ETC | |
| Nota de conteúdo | What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis. Combining the best of three separate traditions--the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science--Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems. |
| 650 #0 - ENTRADA DE ASSUNTO - ASSUNTO TÓPICO | |
| Cabeçalho tópico ou nome geográfico | Economic policy. |
| 700 1# - ENTRADA SECUNDÁRIA - NOME PESSOAL | |
| Nome pessoal | Tabellini, Guido |
| 9 (RLIN) | 68086 |
| 909 ## - IDENTIFICAÇÃO DO CATALOGADOR | |
| Ano e mês da catalogação (aaaamm) | 042023 |
| Identificação do catalogador | Vítor |
| 942 ## - TIPO ESPECÍFICO | |
| Tipo de material | Livro Geral |
| Status de empréstimo | Perdido | Fonte de classificação | Status de danificação | Não pode ser emprestado | Código da coleção | Localização permanente | Localização atual | Data de aquisição | Fonte de aquisição | Número de chamada | Código de barras | Date last seen | Número de exemplar | Preço efetivo a partir de | Tipo de material |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Livro Geral | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | 2023-03-28 | Compra | 338.9 P4679p | 2023-0175 | 2023-04-05 | Ex. 1 | 2023-04-05 | Livro Geral |
