Inclui bibliografia e índice.

1 General Introduction 1.1 Economic Policy 1.2 Politics 1.2 Politics I TOOLS OF POLITICAL ECONOMICS 2 Preferences and Institutions 2.1 A General Policy Problem 2.2 Restricting Preferences 2.3 Restricting Institutions 2.4 Discussion 2.5 Notes on the Literature 2.6 Problems 3 Electoral Competition 3.1 A Simple Model of Public Finance 3.2 Downsian Electoral Competition 3.3 Median-Voter Equilibria 3.4 Probabilistic Voting 3.5 Lobbying 3.6 Discussion 3.7 Notes on the Literature 3.8 Problems 4 Agency 4.1 Efficient Electoral Competition 4.2 Inefficient Electoral Competition 4.3 Enforceability, Verifiability, and Observability 4.4 Electoral Accountability 4.5 Career Concerns 4.6 Discussion 4.7 Notes on the Literature 4.8 Problems 5 Partisan Politicians 5.1 Policy Convergence 5.2 Policy Divergence 5.3 Endogenous Candidates 5.4 Legislative Bargaining 5.5 Discussion 5.6 Notes on the Literature 5.7 Problems II REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS 6 General-Interest Politics 6.1 General Transfers 6.2 Pensions 6.3 Regional Transfers 6.4 Unemployment Insurance 6.5 Discussion 6.6 Notes on the Literature 6.7 Problems 7 Special-Interest Politics 7.1 A Model of Local Public Goods 7.2 Legislative Bargaining 7.3 Lobbying 7.4 Electoral Competition 7.5 Interactions 7.6 Discussion 7.7 Notes on the Literature 7.8 Problems III COMPARATIVE POLITICS 8 Electoral Rules and Electoral Competition 8.1 The Economic Model 8.2 The Politics of Electoral Competition 8.3 Single-District (Proportional) Elections 8.4 Multiple-District (Majoritarian) Elections 8.5 Broad versus Targeted Redistribution 8.6 Discussion 8.7 Notes on the Literature 8.8 Problems 9 Institutions and Accountability 9.1 Electoral Rules and Career Concerns 9.2 Electoral Rules and Accountability 9.3 Separation of Powers 9.4 Notes on the Literature 9.5 Problems 10 Political Regimes 10.1 Policy Choices in a Simple Legislature 10.2 Presidential-Congressional Regimes 10.3 Parliamentary Regimes 10.4 Discussion 10.5 Notes on the Literature 10.6 Problems IV DYNAMIC POLITICS 11 Dynamic Policy Problems 11.1 Analyzing Dynamic Policy Games 11.2 Examples 11.3 Discussion 11.4 Notes on the Literature 11.5 Problems 12 Capital Taxation 12.1 A Simple Model of Dynamic Taxation 12.2 Credibility 12.3 Politics 12.4 Tax Competition 12.5 Discussion 12.6 Notes on the Literature 12.7 Problems 13 Public Debt 13.1 A Simple Model of Public Debt 13.2 The Dynamic Common-Pool Problem 13.3 Political Instability 13.4 Delayed Stabilizations 13.5 Debt and Intergenerational Politics 13.6 Discussion 13.7 Notes on the Literature 13.8 Problems 14 Growth 14.1 Income Inequality and Growth 14.2 Political Instability and Growth 14.3 Special Interests, Rents, and Growth 14.4 Other Political Determinants of Growth 14.5 Discussion 14.6 Notes on the Literature 14.7 Problems V MONETARY POLITICS 15 Credibility of Monetary Policy 15.1 A Simple Model of Monetary Policy 15.2 Ex Ante Optimality 15.3 Credibility 15.4 Reputation 15.5 Dynamics 15.6 Notes on the Literature 15.7 Problems 16 Electoral Cycles 16.1 Career Concerns and Political Business Cycles 16.2 Partisan Cycles 16.3 Notes on the Literature 16.4 Problems 17 Institutions and Incentives 17.1 Simple Rules and Escape Clauses 17.2 Central Bank Independence 17.3 Inflation Targets and Contracts 17.4 Notes on the Literature 17.5 Problems 18 International Policy Coordination 18.1 A Simple Two-Country Model 18.2 Incentives 18.3 Institutions 18.4 Discussion 18.5 Notes on the Literature 18.6 Problems 19 What Next? 19.1 Some Positive Ouestions 19.2 Analytical Issues 19.3 Concluding Remarks References Author Index Subiect Index

What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis.
Combining the best of three separate traditions--the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science--Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.