| 000 -LEADER |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
02341naa a2200181uu 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
|---|
| control field |
8814 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
|---|
| control field |
OSt |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
|---|
| control field |
20190211154541.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
|---|
| fixed length control field |
021202s2005 xx ||||gr |0|| 0 eng d |
| 999 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBERS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha Dewey Subclass [OBSOLETE] |
PHL2MARC21 1.1 |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
|---|
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title |
eng |
| 100 1# - MAIN ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
COHN, Daniel |
| 9 (RLIN) |
2339 |
| 245 10 - TITLE STATEMENT |
|---|
| Title |
No place to hide : |
| Remainder of title |
the unfeasibility of using an independent expert commission as a blameavoidance mechanism in westminster polities - the case of the Ontario Health Services Restructuring Commission |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. |
|---|
| Date of publication, distribution, etc. |
2001 |
| 520 3# - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc. |
The argument presented in this article is that the appointment of an ad hoc expert commission to carry out governance is unlikely to depoliticize difficult restructuring issues or to deflect blame from governments dealing with such problems in Westminster-style polities. Unlike in America-style presidential systems and parliamentray systems with proportional representation experiencing frequent minority governments, such commissions can never be truly independente as there are no serious checks on the government`s ability to remake the agency, its mandate, its composition, nor even any barriers to the government`s premature termination of and ad hoc expert comission`s authority. When governments in a Westminister-style polity seek to establish the appearance that such a commission is an independent agency of governance they must work at cross-purposes to the basic rules for insuring accountability by giving such a body a very vague mandate. This will almost certainty lead to disputes between political actors and the commission over its powers and refocus blame on the government. The ministers of a government employing this strategy must also be extraordinarily cargul so as not to engage in any activities that would undermine the ad hoc expert commission`s already fragile claim to autonomy, otherwise the blame focused on the government will magnify even futher. The difficulties involved in employing an ad hoc expert commission as a means to depoliticize decisions and as a blasme-avoidance strategy for governments in westminster-stuyle polities are illustrated in the Ontario government`s experience with the Health Services Restructuring Commission (HSRC) |
| 773 08 - HOST ITEM ENTRY |
|---|
| Title |
Canadian Public Administration |
| Related parts |
44, 1, p. 26-46 |
| Place, publisher, and date of publication |
, 2001 |
| Record control number |
|
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Koha item type |
Periódico |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
|---|
| -- |
20021202 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
Cassio |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Cassio |
| 998 ## - LOCAL CONTROL INFORMATION (RLIN) |
|---|
| -- |
20060629 |
| Operator's initials, OID (RLIN) |
1147^b |
| Cataloger's initials, CIN (RLIN) |
Quiteria |
