Competitive forces are producing changes in regulatory decision making in once hihgly regulated domestic industries. Where suich changes have ocurred, regulatory theory need to reflect these new dynamics. To support this hipothesys, the author draws upon a major U.S. Department of Transportation airline awards case where regulatory officials had to decide wich combination of new and expanded U.S. carrier service to Japan would provide "the greatest public benefit over time". The evidence suggests that the department's decision turned on a broader rather than narrower view of competition. That is, greater public benefits were to be achieved by strnghening U.S carrier competition against foreign carriers thereby providing more competition among U.S. carriers. In making this decision, regulators also had to consider "civic support" for specific carrier awards from cities, states, and consumer stakeholders who would benefit from new and expanded service. Thus, the political competition for six awards (three of wich were the Tokyo prize) pitted nine U.S. carriers and dozens of cities, states, and airport authorities against one another in one of the most celebrated route award cases in department memory. In an earlier period of airlines regulation, the author contends that the issues and outcomes would likely have been different. However, a changed competitive arena has altered regulatory decisions. As such, the case seeks to break new ground in viewing regulatory politics

public administration review par

january/february 1996

volume 56 numero 4