The effect of CEO pay deviations on CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profits
By: FONG, Eric A
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Contributor(s): MISANGYI, Vilmos F | TOSI Jr., Henry L.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: U.S.A : Wiley-Blackwell, june 2010Subject(s): Alta Administração | Salário | Mercado de Trabalho | Análise Ocupacional | Custo BenefícioStrategic Management Journal 31, 6, p. 629-651Abstract: We build upon previous work on the effects of deviations in CEO pay from labor markets to assess how overcompensation or undercompensation affects subsequent voluntary CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profitability, taking into account the moderating effect of firm ownership structure. We find that CEO underpayment is related to changes in firm size and CEO withdrawal, and that the relationship between CEO underpayment and CEO withdrawal is stronger in owner-controlled firms. We also show that when CEOs are overpaid, there is higher firm profitability; a relationship that is weaker among manager-controlled firms. We then discuss the implications that these findings have for future research.
We build upon previous work on the effects of deviations in CEO pay from labor markets to assess how overcompensation or undercompensation affects subsequent voluntary CEO withdrawal, firm size, and firm profitability, taking into account the moderating effect of firm ownership structure. We find that CEO underpayment is related to changes in firm size and CEO withdrawal, and that the relationship between CEO underpayment and CEO withdrawal is stronger in owner-controlled firms. We also show that when CEOs are overpaid, there is higher firm profitability; a relationship that is weaker among manager-controlled firms. We then discuss the implications that these findings have for future research.
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