Constitutional agenda-setting through discretion in rule interpretation : why the European Parliament Won at Amsterdam
By: HIX, Simon
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Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: 2002British Journal of Political Science 32, 2, p. 259-280Abstract: It is a widely accepted that the 1990 Treaty of Amsterdam significantly increased the powers of the European Parliament (EP). The critical question, however, is why the European Union (EU) governments didi this. I argue, contrary to existing explanations, that these changes came about because the EP was a `constitutional agenda-setter'. The rules in the EU Treaty, as established at Maastricht, were incomplete contracts, and the EU governments had imperfect information about the precise operation of the Treaty. As a result, the EP was able to re-interpret these rules to its advantage and threaten not to co-operate with the governments unless they accepted the EP's interpretations. The article shows how this process of discretion, interpretation and acceptance worked in thetwo main areas of EP powwer: in the legislative process (in the refor of the co-decision procedure). The article concludes that `agenda-setting trough discretion in rule interpretatin' is a common story in the development of the powers of parliaments, both at the domestic and EU levels
| Item type | Current location | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Periódico | Biblioteca Graciliano Ramos | Periódico | Not for loan |
It is a widely accepted that the 1990 Treaty of Amsterdam significantly increased the powers of the European Parliament (EP). The critical question, however, is why the European Union (EU) governments didi this. I argue, contrary to existing explanations, that these changes came about because the EP was a `constitutional agenda-setter'. The rules in the EU Treaty, as established at Maastricht, were incomplete contracts, and the EU governments had imperfect information about the precise operation of the Treaty. As a result, the EP was able to re-interpret these rules to its advantage and threaten not to co-operate with the governments unless they accepted the EP's interpretations. The article shows how this process of discretion, interpretation and acceptance worked in thetwo main areas of EP powwer: in the legislative process (in the refor of the co-decision procedure). The article concludes that `agenda-setting trough discretion in rule interpretatin' is a common story in the development of the powers of parliaments, both at the domestic and EU levels
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