Political economy of preferential : the case of bilateral asymmetric negotiation
By: MOTTA, Daniel augusto
.
Material type: 
ArticlePublisher: São Paulo : Editora 34, jul. /set. 2007Revista de Economia Política = Brazilian Journal of Political Economy 27, 2, p. 193-208Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage and the Stackelberg coalition-proof equilibrium defines t the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economys negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the political economy of preferential trade agreements based on a sequential non-cooperative Stackelberg political game between a large economy and a small one, in which the political dispute of rival lobby groups defines the unilateral stance of both governments in the first stage and the Stackelberg coalition-proof equilibrium defines t the free trade agreement format in the second stage. Finally, a few modifications in the initial game structure are discussed in order to enhance the small economys negotiation power. The political economy model is applied to FTAA case
v. 27 n. 2 (106)
Click on an image to view it in the image viewer
There are no comments for this item.