In Economy and Society, Max Weber posits that bureaucracies that are not reined in by either democratic controls or market discipline will eventually start to pursue public policies that are detrimental to those whose lives these policies should enable or improve. During the last ten years, a number of scholars, activists, parliamentarians, journalists and whistleblowers have come to argue that Weber's hypothesis has often held up for the functioning of multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization. At least, it appears that little democratic control or market discipline has been imposed on multilateral organizations. Moreover, critics from both the left and the right have severely criticized such multilateral policies as development lending, deregulation of financial markets, and structural adjustment programs. Yet it remains difficult to agree upon appropriate remedies. Many proposals—ranging from outright abolishment of large international organizations to the establishment of global parliaments at the United Nations—have been tabled, but little consensus reigns and various disadvantages (as well as advantages) cling to each of these proposals. This special issue of Governance considers yet another way in which to make multilateral organizations more democratic and pluralistic: by making these organizations more deliberatively democratic. This introduction clarifies what is meant by deliberative decision–making and why it is worthwhile to consider making multilateral organizations more deliberative. It also sets out the other contributions to the issue, which offer different justifications for increased deliberation and discuss alternative forms in which multilateral organizations can be made more deliberatively democratic.